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LAUNCH FACILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A LIQUID FLUORINE UPPER STAGE




In a parallel activity to the development of a 
liquid fluorine upper stage vehicle, the problems 
associated with the launch facility must be ad­ 
dressed. This paper describes the factors that 
must be considered in the design and operation of 
such a facility. Among the factors discussed are 
general fluorine system requirements, launch facil­ 
ity requirements, safety considerations, and modi­ 
fication costs. Specific attention is given to 
storage and transfer, vapor disposal, leak detec­ 
tion, spills, aborts, range safety, and personnel 
protection.
INTRODUCTION
A parallel activity to the development of a fluo­ 
rine stage is the development of the supporting 
ground facility. General information regarding 
handling of fluorine is available but the specific 
problems associated with fluorine aerospace ground 
equipment require delineation. In particular, it 
is necessary to consider the problems associated 
with the handling of this extremely reactive pro- 
pellant in areas where personnel and sophisticated 
equipment are needed to support normal launch ac­ 
tivities of an upper stage containing up to 20,000 
Ib of fluorine. The general safety requirements 
for liquid fluorine will be more severe than those 
imposed on systems using earth storable propel- 
lants. Consequently, extreme care must be taken 
to minimize all hazards associated with fluorine. 
This paper describes the equipment and techniques 
that must be considered for such a facility modi­ 
fication.
GENERAL FLUORINE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
The highly reactive nature of fluorine requires 
that the fluorine system be specially constructed 
and prepared. The selection of materials, control 
of contamination,and passivation of the system are 
primary examples of these general requirements. 
Numerous documents, such as references listed, give 
extensive data in these areas. The use of these 
documents is highly recommended. Since this in­ 
formation is readily available and is generally 
applicable to all fluorine facilities, these items 
are treated only briefly in this paper.
Material Selection
some conditions , and frequently these reactions 
are violent. Clean metals react slowly with 
fluorine at ambient or lower temperatures, form­ 
ing a metal fluoride film on the surface that 
stops or greatly reduces subsequent reaction. 
However, if the metal is contaminated, the fluo­ 
rine reaction with the contaminant may increase 
the local temperature to the point where the 
metal will react rapidly with the fluorine. If 
the fluorine supply is not removed, this reaction 
may become self sustaining. Organic materials 
generally react violently on contact with fluo­ 
rine, resulting in ignition or explosion. The 
heat of reaction is always high and unless the 
heat can be rapidly transferred away from the re­ 
action zone, ignition is probable.
The degree of the reaction with any material is a 
function of the quantity and concentration of 
fluorine available, material, temperature, and
time of exposure. Since a wide variety of 
operating conditions will exist, and material 
compatibility is a function of these conditions, 
it is very important that the material selection 
be based on the actual intended use, e.g., ma­ 
terials compatible with gaseous fluorine may not 
be compatible with liquid fluorine.
System Cleanliness
Material selection is of prime importance in the 
design of a facility using liquid fluorine. Basi­ 
cally, all materials react with fluorine under
The most important factor in the safe operation 
of a facility using liquid fluorine is system 
cleanliness. The majority of system failures due 
to burn out or ignition can probably be traced to 
contaminants in the system. Commercial liquid 
and gaseous fluorine contain contaminants such as 
OF2 , 02, N2 , CFi^, C02> and HF, but the quantities 
are generally small and present no great problem. 
System corrosion may be increased due to these 
contaminants, but it is felt that this increase
in corrosion is insignificant. Of greatest 
concern is the contaminant left in the system due 
to incomplete cleaning or contaminants that enter 
the system during or after assembly. Any system 
material that comes in contact with fluorine 
should be immaculately clean to avoid uncontrolled 
reactions. Support commodities such a pressuriza- 
tion helium and purge nitrogen used for fluorine 
systems should be filtered, dry, and free of hy­ 
drocarbon contaminants. Once assembled, the sys­ 
tem should be kept under a positive pressure to 
prevent the entrance of air and water vapor into 
the system. Extensive studies have been conducted 
on the reaction of organic materials under pas-
(2) sivation conditions using gaseous fluorine.
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These studies indicate that organic contaminant 
reactions are sometimes incomplete and the residue 
can be violently reactive with liquid fluorine, 
either spontaneously or on shock or impact. 
Therefore, stringent cleaning requirements to 
eliminate contaminants from the system are abso­ 
lutely necessary.
After assembly, moisture may enter the system if 
a positive pressure is not maintained at all 
times. If moisture is present when fluorine is 
introduced into the system, it will react to form 
hydrogen fluoride, which can cause extensive cor­ 
rosion damage. If sufficient moisture is present 
to condense and form accumulations of water or 
ice, a violent reaction may occur when fluorine 
is introduced, resulting in possible burnout of 
the system.
Because elimination of contaminants is critical, 
it is of utmost importance to establish and ad­ 
here to stringent cleanliness requirements. A 
number of satisfactory cleaning and verification 
methods have been developed by the various fluo­ 
rine facilities and are described in the litera­ 
ture.
Passivation
All parts of the system that will be in contact 
with fluorine during actual operations must be 
passivated before liquid fluorine is introduced 
into the system. Passivation makes the internal 
surfaces of the system inert by controlled re­ 
action with gaseous fluorine. The internal metal 
surfaces react and inert metal fluoride films are 
formed that prevent or retard further reaction. 
In the past it was felt that this controlled re­ 
action would also remove any system contaminants 
that remained after cleaning, but recent investi­ 
gations indicate that this is dangerous prac­ 
tice. Passivation must not be considered the 
final cleaning step. The system should be pas­ 
sivated only after the necessary cleaning and dry­ 
ing have been completed.
Passivation can be accomplished in a number of 
ways, including the vacuum method, purge method, 
or combinations of these, depending on system size 
and complexity. Briefly, the vacuum method in­ 
volves system evacuation, followed by repressur- 
ization with gaseous fluorine. The purge method 
involves displacement of an inert purge gas with 
a gaseous fluorine purge. Final passivation 
should be performed using undiluted gaseous fluo­ 
rine at the maximum system operating pressure and 
at ambient temperature.
LAUNCH FACILITY IMPACT
The basic problem is to provide the necessary 
propellant storage, transfer, and disposal facil­ 
ity for supporting an upper stage requiring up to 
20,000 Ib of liquid fluorine. Various facility 
configurations, vehicle loading methods , and spe­ 
cific factors affecting the design of such a fa­ 
cility are discussed in detail,
LF2 Storage Methods
One of the primary considerations in the design 
of a fluorine launch facility is the selection of 
the fluorine storage method. Practical methods 
of LF2 storage include on-pad storage, on-umbil­ 
ical tower storage, mobile storage, and in vehi­ 
cle tank storage. The principal elements, ad­ 
vantages, and disadvantages of each of these con­ 
cepts are presented.
On-pad storage, downwind from the launch operation 
is safe and practical. All preload activities 
can take place in the revetted, protected, and 
isolated area while other on-pad activities are 
progressing. The storage area can be located at 
a distance from the vehicle to provide maximum 
protection from any on-pad vehicle incidents. The 
transfer lines from the storage area to the space 
vehicle tanks will be long and require consider­ 
able cooldown time, either with LN2 or LF2 before 
vehicle loading.
The principal elements of this loading system in­ 
clude a permanent remote storage area and transfer 
piping to the vehicle. The storage dewar will be 
used to receive and store liquid fluorine from 
mobile dewars and also serve as a ready service 
vessel during transfer operations.
A second practical method of on-pad storage would 
be to locate the storage dewar in the umbilical 
tower or launch/umbilical tower (L/UT) . Storage 
in this area would be at the vehicle fluorine tank 
level and would include both LF2 and LN2 dewars 
(see Figure 1) . The advantages of this approach 
are the reduction of cooldown time, rapid response 
loading, localized launch pad effected area, and 
a reduction in venting or in LN2 precooling re­ 
quirements. The disadvantages are the storage of 
LF2 in the immediate vicinity of operations per­ 
sonnel and the higher susceptibility of damage 
either to or from the space vehicle in case of 
problems.
The principal elements of this loading system are 
the ground load station at the base of the umbil­ 
ical tower, transfer piping up to the proper level 
of the umbilical tower, a loading dewar, and 
transfer piping to the vehicle. The loading dewar 
will be used to receive and store liquid fluorine 
from mobile dewars. The dewar will be vacuum and 
LN2 jacketed to retain the fluorine with no boil- 
off losses.
The fluorine dewar is loaded from a loading sta­ 
tion at the base of the umbilical tower through a 
liquid nitrogen-jacketed line. This transfer can 
be accomplished prior to launch day. A mobile 
dewar is moved to the loading station when re­ 
plenishment is necessary. The liquid nitrogen 
jacket on the fluorine line is dual purpose be­ 
cause it is also used to transfer liquid nitrogen 
to the nitrogen dewar loacted on the umbilical 
tower.
Since catastrophic dewar failures are almost un­ 
known, this system does not present a severe haz­ 
ard. However, to further decrease the hazard
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potential of the system, the storage dewars would 
be located in a special enclosure. This enclosure 
can be constructed on the outer edge of the um­ 
bilical tower, out of the path of most operations. 
The structure would use blast walls to separate 
the dewars from the umbilical tower. Blast walls 
would also be placed between the nitrogen and 
fluorine dewars. The enclosure would be equipped 
with a water fog deluge system for fire control and 
decontamination in the event of dewar rupture or 
burnthrough.
A third storage method involves use of mobile de- 
wars that can be carried up the equipment elevator 
to the vehicle fluorine tank level. Even if sev­ 
eral dewars were required to fill the vehicle 
tanks, this system has advantages of low fixed 
facility costs and the extremely localized effects 
on the total facility. Existing mobile dewars 
with an LF2 capacity of 450 gallons weigh 10,000 
lb (not including the LN2 or LF2 weight) and are 
approximately 23 ft long, 11 ft high, and 8 ft 
wide. These dewars can service a space vehicle 
with a maximum of several loads. This system 
would not provide rapid loading because several 
connections are required and the logistics of mov­ 
ing the dewar to the vehicle would require some 
time. Remote operation would be more difficult 
and personnel would be in a relatively restricted 
area (no rapid egress available). If only a few 
launches are planned, the mobile dewars could be 
located behind the barrier as discussed previously 
without the additional costs of fixed piping and 
dewar systems. Another possible configuration 
would use mobile equipment located at the base of 
the umbilical tower with a fixed transfer line to 
the vehicle. Rapid personnel egress would be a 
major advantage of this system over the other 
mobile system.
A fourth method of loading the space vehicle in­ 
volves preloading of the LF2 tank before mating the 
stage to the booster. The tank would be loaded 
from a permanent or mobile dewar in a remote serv­ 
ice area. This process has been used successfully 
for earth storables on several payload packages. 
It has a severe disadvantage in that the light­ 
weight vehicle tank will contain a hazardous cryo­ 
genic commodity for several days while checkouts 
occur. The maintenance of the unvented tank would 
require an active refrigeration system on or asso­ 
ciated with the vehicle.
The specific quantities of propellant, countdown 
time available for loading operations, number of 
launches anticipated, and launch pad safety re­ 
strictions will be important criteria in selecting 
the proper storage method.
Propellant Transfer System
The transfer system configuration must be selected 
concurrently with the storage system. Major areas 
to be considered include transfer lines, control 
valving, and the method of fluid transfer.
The type of transfer line depends on the storage 
method and the length of the line. For short dis­ 
tances the transfer line may be uninsulated. For
longer distances, the transfer lines should be 
vacuum or LN2 jacketed. Where the venting or dis­ 
posal of copious quantities of fluorine is unde­ 
sirable, the lines should be LN2 jacketed. The 
LN2 jacket can be filled first to precool the line. 
The LN2 also eliminates heat transfer into the LF2 
during transfer. If the LN2 jacket is maintained 
at atmospheric pressure, the fluorine will be sub- 
cooled with a vapor pressure of approximately 5 
psia. However, a slight positive pressure (20 
psig) in the LN2 jacket will maintain the LF2 at a 
vapor pressure slightly above atmospheric to pre­ 
vent the entrance of contaminants.
The addition of an LN2 jacket has several advan­ 
tages. Since fluorine will not react with LN2 in 
small quantities, the jacket can absorb some fluo­ 
rine leakage with only minimal hazard. The leak 
can be detected by sampling effluent from the LN2 
vent stack. Considerably less fluorine disposal 
or recycling will be required since no fluorine 
boiloff will occur. The less hazardous operation 
of precooling the transfer lines with LN2 permits 
a shorter duration LF2 transfer, which shortens 
launch pad restriction time. Since the propel­ 
lant is maintained in a single-phase flow condi­ 
tion, less pressure will be required for transfer.
Heat transfer rates from the atmosphere to a 
nitrogen-jacketed transfer line have been evalu­ 
ated for various pipe diameters and frost or in­ 
sulation thicknesses. Nitrogen consumption in 
pounds per hour can be readily estimated using 
this information. The transfer line must be 
sized to meet the flow rate and operating pres­ 
sure requirements of the specific system. If 
adequate transfer pressure is available the line 
size should be optimized for diameter. However, 
if pressure drop is critical, the line should be 
optimized within limits of practical sizes. For 
subcooled liquid fluorine, the line size can be 
selected using standard equations.
Liquid fluorine can be transferred by pumping or 
gas pressurization. It is desirable to transfer 
fluorine without pumping. Although some develop­ 
ment work has been done on LF2 transfer pumps, a 
review of the literature failed to reveal any op­ 
erational transfer pumps presently in service. 
Pressurized transfer with makeup pressure by 
helium is essentially trouble-free and very re­ 
liable. The necessary transfer pressure can be 
calculated by adding the frictional loss and the 
head loss from standard equations. When trans­ 
ferring to the vehicle, the minimum acceptable 
pressure at the vehicle tank will be 16 psia to 
preclude tank implosion and prevent contamination 
from entering the tank. Transfer of the fluorine 
from ground level to an upper stage level will 
require relatively high pressure. These pressures 
exceed the maximum operating pressure of presently 
available dewars, necessitating the design and 
fabrication of high-pressure storage vessels or 
the use of a pump transfer system.
Regardless of the type of transfer system se­ 
lected, design of the control valving should use 
remote operation. Transfer valving and control 
systems should not present major problems for the
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designer since several operational fluorine facil­ 
ities use adequate methods of transfer control. 
Proper valve wiring (normal position in power 
loss) and automatic system safing (closing valves 
to isolate any damaged area) should be determined 
by a thorough hazard or failure mode analysis and 
incorporated in the design.
Space Vehicle Tank Loading and Ground Hold
A number of alternative on-pad loading concepts 
are available. Fester, Page and Bingham have de­ 
rived and experimentally proven a satisfactory
(4) no-vent loading concept. Rose suggests that
an LN2 overspray can be added to the vehicle tank 
and the resulting gaseous nitrogen can be used 
effectively to purge the high performance multi­ 
layer insulation system on the tank. NASA 
LeRC has used an open top integral LN2 tank 
(beanie) in facility operation and Rocketdyne has
used a closed top beanie. Another alternative 
is to load the tank in a vented condition, al­ 
though this is not desirable since vented vapor 
disposal or reliquefaction is required.
Fester, et al., in the Liquid Fluorine No-Vent 
Loading Studies concluded a no-vent fill of a
(4) prechilled vehicle tank is very feasible.
Based on this no-vent loading study, this method 
appears satisfactory for loading fluorine into a 
vehicle tank. The primary criterion, aside from 
not venting, is to maintain a positive pressure 
inside the tank to prevent implosion. The tank 
would include an integral tube-type heat ex­ 
changer on the tank wall.
Before loading, the ambient temperature tank would 
contain 100% gaseous fluorine at about 60 psia. 
The loading process would be initiated by cooldown 
of the tank by passing cold GN2 or LN2 through the 
integral heat exchanger. After the tank has been 
cooled, propellant loading would be initiated. 
The condition of the propellant being loaded would 
be such that its temperature would be slightly 
greater than its atmospheric saturation tempera­ 
ture when entering the tank. The temperature of 
the tank and loaded liquid would be maintained 
slightly above the atmospheric saturation temper­ 
ature to maintain the ullage pressure slightly 
above one atmosphere. As loading commences, con­ 
densation of vapor prevents the ullage pressure 
from rising appreciably. After loading is com­ 
plete, the tank would be pressurized with helium 
to 15 psi above propellant vapor pressure and the 
integral heat exchanger would be used to maintain 
the propellant temperature within the desired 
temperature band for ground hold. Adequately high 
flow rates will be attainable with this method as 
long as the initial commodity in the warm vehicle 
tank is a condensible, such as GF2 .
No-vent loading is a very acceptable approach for 
conducting load operations with high-energy pro- 
pellants at the launch complex, where release of 
toxic and reactive vapors must be minimized. Em­ 
pirical data obtained in a 300-gallon LF2 flow
facility agrees well with the analytical model de-
(A\ 
veloped in this program. v '
Rose modified the airborne tank by adding an LN2 
spray system in lieu of the integral tube-type heat
exchanger. Two manifolds, one at the top, and 
one at the midsection of the tank, and several 
perforated tubes are used to distribute a thin 
film of liquid nitrogen over the outside surface 
of the tank under the multilayer insulation. This 
thin film of liquid nitrogen intercepts incoming 
heat before it reaches the tank wall. The inter­ 
cepted heat vaporizes the liquid nitrogen and the 
resulting gaseous nitrogen diffuses out through 
the multilayer insulation. In this way, the spray 
cooling system purges the insulation and protects 
the tank from incoming heat. Transfer is still by 
the no-vent load method.
The spray cooling system is used only for cooldown, 
but it can be continued if an unexpected hold is 
encountered after the fluorine tank has been 
loaded. Normally, the gaseous nitrogen purge that 
is maintained before loading propellants is con­ 
tinued until launch. Both the gaseous nitrogen 
purge and the liquid nitrogen used for cooling are 
introduced into the insulation through the same 
manifold.
In their facilities, NASA LeRC and Rocketdyne use 
an LN2 container that is integral with the tank. 
Although it was developed for ground storage, it 
is possible to adapt the design for airborne use. 
An open-top beanie as shown in Figure 2 can be 
used to recondense the fluorine vapors resulting 
from heat input to the tank. The beanie can be 
drained just before launch. Rocketdyne ! s closed 
beanie (see Figure 3) can provide the same type 
of condenser with an additional feature of a con­ 
trollable vent to keep the LN2 pressurized and the 
fluorine tank pressure closely controlled.
Another approach would be to cooldown the vented 
vehicle tank with fluorine as the intial transfer 
step similar to the loading methods used with 
other cryogens. Heavy venting and the necessity 
to recondense the GF2 or dispose of many pounds of 
expensive fluorine makes this system very undesir­ 
able. This method would necessitate continual 
topping during ground holds.
The most efficient loading concept can be chosen 
after vehicle on-pad-loaded hold times, tank sizes 
and configurations, loading flow rates, insula­ 
tion materials, and pad safety requirements are 
known .
Vapor Disposal
Propellant handling at a launch facility will re­ 
quire the venting of fluorine vapors during trans­ 
fer, depressurization, or purge activities. 
Methods of disposal of these vapors must be eval­ 
uated and incorporated into the facility to pre­ 
vent endangering personnel, property, water shed, 
vegetation, or local wild life. Due to the tox- 
icity and reactivity of fluorine, venting directly
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to the atmosphere must be prevented. Several 
methods are available to eliminate venting or to 
dispose of normal vent vapors in a safe manner.
^^ ^ Since it appears unlikely that all vent­ 
ing can be eliminated, a combination of methods 
appears feasible. The storage vessel can be 
equipped with a recondenser to liquify boiloff 
vapors from the system, a vaporizer for self- 
pressurization, and an LN2 jacket to subcool the 
stored propellant. These features result in a 
no-loss storage system that requires no normal 
venting. However, venting of the storage system 
could be required due to a control system mal­ 
function or LN2 shortage. This venting along 
with normal transfer line purging or vented tank 
loading methods would require the system to in­ 
corporate a vapor disposal system.
Methods available and presently used to detoxify 
or dispose of fluorine vapors include hydrocarbon 
burners, charcoal reactors, or alkaline chemical
(3) treatment. The methods most adaptable for use
at a launch facility are the hydrocarbon burner or 
charcoal reactor. The hydrocarbon burner type is 
installed at the top of a vent stack and reacts 
the fluorine with propane or methane above the 
stack exit. The reaction product is basically CF4 
and HF. Since HF is only slightly less toxic than 
fluorine and is more corrosive, this system should 
only be used in areas where venting of these prod­ 
ucts would not be harmful or the vent rate is con­ 
trolled so that tolerable atmospheric HF concen­ 
trations are not exceeded. A charcoal reactor 
similar to the one shown in Figure 4 would be 
the best system for use at a launch facility of
the size being considered. This method in­ 
volves the reaction of fluorine with wood charcoal 
to form CFij. which is basically inert and non- 
toxic. Small quantities of fluorine can be de­ 
tected in the reactor effluent, but are generally 
below 100 ppm and will rapidly disperse into the 
atmosphere. The disposal rate is dependent on the 
surface area of the charcoal available for reac­ 
tion. The rate increases as the size of charcoal 
particles decreases. Moisture or impurities in 
the charcoal may result in HF in the effluent, 
but the quantity should be small compared to that 
of a hydrocarbon burner.
Both of these disposal methods can be used to 
dispose of 100% fluorine vapor or vapor diluted 
with N2 and/or He. Some dilution of the vented 
fluorine vapor with an inert gas is recommended to 
decrease the reaction temperatures and prolong the 
life of the disposal system.
LEAK DETECTION
Leaks can be classified as hazardous to personnel 
and/or hazardous to equipment. Adequate litera­ 
ture is available to help in the selection of ap­ 
propriate sensors for detection of the various 
levels of leaks. Consistently, however, these 
articles point to the inadequacy of all instru­ 
ments designed for fluorine detection. Several 
acceptable units are available, but each will 
need attention to assure proper operation and
sensing at a launch complex. Basically six types 
of leak detection methods are available.
1) The human nose;
2) Ammonium hydroxide squirt bottles;
3) Potassium iodide paper;
4) An electrical warning system;
5) Chemical instruments;
6) Infrared sensors.
Extensive elaboration of these methods would only 
be repetitive to other articles.
Briefly, however, the conditions that must be de­ 
tected can be separated into gaseous fluorine 
leaks, liquid fluorine leaks or spills, and vapor 
concentration in effluents.
A gaseous fluorine leak may stem from a leak in 
an ambient temperature gas system, a semicooled 
liquid system, such as during cooldown, or a 
small leak in a liquid system when cooled down. 
Any leaks require immediate attention to elimi­ 
nate them. Most common among these are leaky 
fittings, disconnects, valve stems, and instru­ 
mentation ports. The human nose is a very good 
sensor for low concentrations and can be relied 
upon to tell a technician when concentrations 
are growing. Ammonium hydroxide squirt bottles, 
potassium iodide paper, or an electrical warning 
system of the burgular alarm type can be effec­ 
tively used to sense the leak. When leakage is 
detected, the system should be vented; the exact 
location determined, and immediately repaired. 
Safety requires that all leaks be repaired in an 
unpressurized and purged condition.
Liquid fluorine leaks or spills are very hazardous. 
Usually a liquid leak will cause burning on con­ 
tact with almost anything, including protective 
clothing, surrounding incompatible or contaminated 
equipment, and often the line from which it came. 
Leaks of this nature can be sensed with infrared 
sensors or burnout wires located in the area of 
potential leaks. These sensors can be used to op­ 
erate automatic deluge systems or to automatically 
isolate the affected area. Conditions that must 
be detected, but are not necessarily hazardous, in­ 
clude fluorine concentration in jacket vent sys­ 
tems, in the disposal stack, or in effluent purge 
gases.
As noted, the LN2 jacket around fluorine transfer 
systems helps minimize the hazard associated with 
a leak in the fluorine line. Unfortunately, it 
also obscures the location and makes detection 
difficult. The addition of a fluorine sensing 
instrument in the jacket vent system will aid in 
determining the concentration, if any, of fluorine 
being vented. A quantity limit, beyond which a 
warning is sounded, can be established and used.
A very good method of determining when the char­ 
coal level in the disposal unit is low is to 
sample the disposal stack effluent. A small
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amount of fluorine will always be present so the 
sensor could be set to sound the alarm at a level 
of 100 ppm. Sensing the hot effluent, however, 
may be difficult with existing equipment.
Before any system that have previously contained 
fluorine can be opened for maintenance it must be 
thoroughly purged with an inert gas. Equations 
regarding the required length of purge time exist 
and can be used in conjunction with effluent sam­ 
ples to assure safe concentration levels. Chem­ 
ical sensors are very acceptable for this applica­ 
tion.
Leaks and spills are detectable and while they 
pose the most hazardous safety conditions, they 
can be minimized by proper design, care, and op­ 
eration.
Propellant Spillage
The design of any fluorine handling facility must 
include provisions for handling accidental re­ 
leases of fluorine. Although fluorine systems 
are designed to eliminate all leakage, the reac­ 
tive and cryogenic characteristics of the fluorine 
make it virtually impossible to guarantee the pre­ 
vention of accidental spills.
Dispersion is usually considered effective for 
small leaks of gaseous fluorine that create non- 
hazardous concentrations. The escaping fluorine 
is allowed to diffuse into the surrounding area 
and be dispersed by atmospheric conditions. The 
amount of fluorine that can be disposed of safely 
by this method is governed by the location of the 
fluorine system. If the system is in a relatively 
remote area, fairly substantial amounts of fluorine 
could be safely released without treatment. The 
reactivity and toxicity of fluorine make it nec­ 
essary to treat most leakage or spills to limit 
damage. Treatment methods include water deluge 
and chemical neutralization.
Deluging of fluorine spills with a fine water 
spray actually results in reaction of the fluo­ 
rine with the water. The product of the reaction 
is hydrogen fluoride. Sufficient water is used 
to react with the fluorine and to dilute the re­ 
sulting hydrofluoric acid to a harmless concen­ 
tration. The reaction is exothermic, but this 
heat is absorbed by the excess water used in the 
deluge. Use of water for neutralizing fluorine 
spills must be carefully evaluated because the 
reaction is violent. In the case of large spills 
it is difficult to apply sufficient quantities of 
water to control the reaction. Insufficient 
water only tends to spread the contamination. At 
the other extreme if a small leak is deluged the 
damage done by the water may be far greater than 
that which would have been done by the fluorine 
itself. It is necessary to contain and neutral­ 
ize the contaminated water prior to release into 
the water shed.
Another method of treating spills is to neutralize 
the fluorine chemically. For liquid fluorine sys­ 
tems, it is possible to provide catch basins which 
contain limestone. The spilled fluorine is chan­ 
neled to the limestone where it reacts and is
neutralized. Other systems have been devised 
that blanket spill areas with soda ash which neu­ 
tralizes the fluorine. The dry soda ash deluge 
method results in a solid residue that will pre­ 
sent tremendous clean-up problems.
The method for handling fluorine spillage must be 
selected to suit the requirements of the specific 
system. A method which is attractive for one area 
can be completely unsuitable for another. Selec­ 
tion of spill control for a launch facility must 
be based on system requirements, probable spill 
quantities, and system location. On the bright 
side, many studies of fluorine spills indicate 
the magnitude of the problem is grossly overstated. 
In addition chances of these spills occurring can 
be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, by proper 
design and operation.
Aborts
A launch facility for a liquid fluorine upper 
stage must have the capability of safing the ve­ 
hicle should a launch be delayed or aborted after 
propellants have been loaded. The design of the 
facility must provide for three different types of 
aborts or delays.
The system must be capable of maintaining the 
fluorine on board for extended hold periods if an 
unscheduled launch delay is encountered. The 
fluorine must be maintained in a flight condition 
throughout any hold period. Because it is cryo­ 
genic the fluorine will boil off during any hold 
unless it is continuously cooled. Other cryo­ 
genics are usually topped to make up for the boil- 
off losses. Fluorine can also be topped, but it 
is necessary to neutralize or recondense the vent 
gases. To prevent excessive venting it is pos­ 
sible to refrigerate the fluorine tank to maintain 
it in a no-vent condition.
The fluorine ground support system must provide a 
means for off-loading in the event the launch is 
aborted before liftoff. The off-loading capa­ 
bility should include a rapid detanking mode for 
emergency situations. Normal detanking can be 
accomplished by back transfer to the facility 
storage dewar. The storage dewar will have to be 
vented down if it is being used for topping or if 
loading has just been completed. The vent gases 
from the storage dewar must be channeled through 
the disposal system. Detanking can be accom­ 
plished by pressure transfer using the vehicle 
pressurization system to maintain the tank pres­ 
sure.
The necessity of venting the facility storage de- 
war, and in some cases terminating topping opera­ 
tions to prepare for off-loading, could greatly 
delay an emergency off-loading. Therefore, it 
may be necessary to have a separate emergency 
dump system. Emergency off-loading of most cryo­ 
genics is accomplished by dumping the propellant 
into a catch pond where it is allowed to boil off. 
This cannot be permitted with fluorine. There­ 
fore, it may be necessary to have a catch dewar 
ready at all times to receive the fluorine in the 
event it is necessary to dump the tank. Another
4-62
possible method of emergency dumping would be to 
off load the tanks directly to the vent disposal 
system. The remote location of the system would 
provide sufficient transfer lines to allow the 
liquid to boil off before it reached the disposal 
system. If necessary, a holding tank could be 
included in the system to retain any liquid until 
it boiled off and to control the disposal rate.
One other type of abort affects the fluorine sys­ 
tem. This is a catastrophic abort which occurs 
prior to or immediately after liftoff. The ground 
support system must be designed to minimize fluo­ 
rine damage in the event of this type of abort. 
Features of this system would include minimizing 
the amount of fluorine left in transfer lines and 
protecting storage dewars from damage.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
General safety considerations will not differ 
appreciably from those presently in effect for 
other toxic or cryogenic propellants. The three 
specific areas of safety that will require spe­ 
cial emphasis are range safety, atmospheric con­ 
ditions, and personnel protection.
Range Safety
As with any operation conducted at the Air Force 
Eastern Test Range (AFETR) a launch facility for 
a liquid fluorine stage must meet range safety 
rules. It is also necessary for general fluo­ 
rine safety rules to be met. This means that a 
complete review of the current range safety rules 
must be made to ensure that a comprehensive set of 
rules are established.
In general, the range safety rules governing 
toxic and cryogenic propellants are directly ap­ 
plicable to this system. These cover areas such 
as environmental safety, pad access, atmospheric 
conditions, time of loading, etc. However, in 
some areas, such as protective clothing, the cur­ 
rent rules are not adequate for fluorine. This 
indicates that each rule must be reviewed to de­ 
termine if changes are necessary.
Education is one of the prime problems in obtain­ 
ing adequate and realistic range safety require­ 
ments for a fluorine system. To the uninformed 
the word "fluorine" conjures up visions of un­ 
controllable destruction. Thus, people who are 
not familiar with fluorine technology will gen­ 
erally set safety standards that are unnecessarily 
restrictive. In some extreme cases the attitude 
is to insist that fluorine cannot be handled 
safely and therefore will not be permitted.
This problem makes it mandatory that a primary 
effort in developing a fluorine launch facility 
is the education of operations and safety per­ 
sonnel. A coordinated effort can then be made to 
develop adequate, comprehensive range safety rules 
for fluorine systems.
Atmospheric Conditions
To prevent creation of unnecessary hazardous con­ 
ditions it is necessary to define the atmospheric 
conditions under which operations can be con­ 
ducted. Toxic and corrosive vapors must not be 
carried by the winds into area where personnel or 
property damage can occur. Therefore, it will be 
necessary to evaluate any proposed launch facility 
to determine which wind corridors permit safe 
operations. Fluorine equipment must be located 
to take advantage of prevailing winds to disperse 
any fluorine vapors into safe areas.
Figure 5 shows a theoretical launch complex layout 
for a fluorine vehicle. The fluorine storage 
area and vent disposal burner have been sited so 
that they are downwind of all activities the 
majority of time. The wind corridor indicates 
the permissible wind direction for propellant 
transfer or launch operations. The hazard zones 
indicate the areas where exposure can be expected, 
should a spill occur. This type of evaluation 
should be made for any fluorine launch facility.
An additional consideration to be included in 
selection of wind corridors is the launch tra­ 
jectory. The allowable launch wind corridors 
should be selected so that the propellant re­ 
leased from a vehicle destructed after launch 
will be dispersed in a safe area.
Other atmospheric conditions that curtail opera­ 
tions include temperature inversions, which pre­ 
vent adequate vapor dispersion, and rain or fog. 
Venting or inadvertent fluorine releases during 
periods of precipitation result in the formation 
of hydrogen fluoride, which not only causes 
severe corrosion of the facility, but also con­ 
taminates the vegetation, soil, and water shed. 
Soil and atmospheric sampling programs should be 
established to monitor for any long-term increase 
in contamination due to fluorine operations .
Personnel Protection
Much has been prepared regarding the subject of 
personnel protection associated with fluorine sys­ 
tems. Practices should not differ considerably 
from protective equipment and safety practices for 
more conventional earth storable hypergolic pro­ 
pellants such as hydrazine, IRFNA, nitrogen 
tetroxide, etc. The past record of handling fluo­ 
rine is significantly free of accidents and can 
form the basis for the personnel protection pro­ 
gram at a launch complex. Personnel protection 
extends far beyond any connotation of clothing and 
first aid. To summarize, personnel protection 
must include the following areas:
1) System design considerations;
2) Safety practices, rules, and regula­ 
tions;
3) Training programs;
4) Launch complex operations including -
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a) Restriction of access to author­ 
ized and necessary personnel,
b) Personal and equipment cleanli­ 
ness ,
c) Protective clothing and breathing 
equipment ,
d) Controls for maintenance of trans­ 
fer or storage systems,
e) Provision of warning sensors. 
A brief discussion of each of these areas follows.
System Design Considerations - The protection of 
personnel from the hazards of fluorine must be 
considered starting with the design of the trans­ 
fer and storage system. It will be an important 
consideration in the choice of the location, lay­ 
out, buildings and equipment design. The geog­ 
raphy of the terrain, meteorological data, and 
proximity to congested or densely populated areas 
or to inhabited buildings should be included in 
the basic considerations. All the above factors 
include the protection of disinterested and un­ 
informed personnel in surrounding areas. Rapid 
egress for operating personnel must be considered 
in locating piping, components, and pieces of 
equipment.
Safety Practices, Rules, and Regulations - The 
standard safety practices that prevail at instal­ 
lations where hazardous or flammable chemicals 
are stored should be in effect at the launch fa­ 
cility. These practices include restricting the 
traffic near or in the area and adopting the buddy 
system. During any potentially hazardous opera­ 
tion in restricted quarters, trained personnel 
must be equipped with self-contained breathing 
air and complete protective clothing so they may 
come to the immediate aid of the operating per­ 
sonnel in case of a spill or fire.
All operating procedures must be thoroughly checked 
out on a dry or LN£ filled system before operations 
begin with fluorine. Of course, strict adherence 
to the procedures is mandatory. A periodic review 
of rules and regulations and a periodic dry run of 
the procedures is suggested.
Training Programs - The already successful train­ 
ing programs in effect at KSC and AFETR, can easily 
be modified to include fluorine training. The 
alleviation of fear with retention of respect must 
be a major goal of these training programs. Per­ 
sonnel from operational fluorine facilities can 
assist in the preparation of these training pro­ 
grams .
Restriction of Access to Authorized and Necessary 
Personnel - The potential hazards increase in pro­ 
portion to the lack of knowledge of fluorine and 
its properties. For this reason, only authorized 
personnel should be permitted on the launch com­ 
plex during any fluorine operations. Official 
visitors can be permitted if they are briefed on
the basic fundamentals and are continuously es­ 
corted by well-informed and well-trained employees. 
They should also be escorted to safe areas prior 
to starting any hazardous operation such as vehi­ 
cle tank loading. Any unnecessary personnel, even 
though adequately trained, should be prohibited 
from the proximity of any hazardous propellant 
during transfer operations.
Personal and Equipment Cleanliness - Most or all 
operational fluorine facilities have experienced 
failures associated with lack of proper cleanli­ 
ness controls. The required cleanliness level 
inside the system is not argumentative but personal 
cleanliness seems to be questioned. Tools, gloves, 
hands, uniforms, etc, should be free of particles, 
grease, dirt, lint, and general contamination. 
Washing of hands both before and after fluorine 
system work is essential. The small amounts of 
hydrogen fluoride which may be present on valves, 
lines, connections, etc, can burn almost as quickly 
and severely as fluorine. External cleanliness 
helps to promote and maintain internal system 
cleanliness, and the latter is mandatory.
Protective Clothing and Breathing Equipment - The 
NASA-LeRC policy to use protective equipment only 
when it improves safety should be a cardinal rule.
Three different levels of protection seem 
warranted. Operations personnel should be out­ 
fitted with aprons, face shields, hard hats, 
gloves, and boots (see Figure 6). Each of these 
items must be quickly removable in case of fire. 
Rapid movement from the area is the prime reason­ 
ing for this level of garmenting. A second, and 
more protective style of clothing includes, a 
self-contained breathing air pack and a full pro­ 
tective uniform. A person in this clothing can 
withstand higher levels of fluorine concentration 
for short periods of time and can aid operations 
personnel in case they become disabled in a fluo­ 
rine atmosphere. Even this equipment should be 
able to be removed rapidly since it won't be com­ 
patible with direct sprays of fluorine and may 
ignite and burn. Operating personnel may be out­ 
fitted with this uniform if they must enter a very 
restricted area and cannot evacuate the area com­ 
pletely in case of a problem. A third type of 
protection is applicable for most other personnel 
required on the complex during hazardous opera­ 
tions. This consists only of a gas mask equipped 
with a special fluorine cannister (see Figure 7). 
This device must only be used to effect an immedi­ 
ate evacuation from the area. Blockhouse person­ 
nel, supervisors, inspectors, safety personnel, 
and personnel working in other areas should be 
equipped in this manner.
Experience has shown that no safety clothing has 
been devised that will give guaranteed protection 
against a high pressure jet of liquid or gaseous
fluorine. ' The important thing regarding pro­ 
tective materials is to subject them to a test 
under simulated operational conditions, as opposed 
to reliance on data from other tests that may or 
may not be under similar conditions, and then 
restrict their use to the proven conditions.
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Controls for Maintenance of Transfer or Storage 
Systems - Since it is desirable to maintain a 
positive pressure in a fluorine system, any en­ 
tries into the system can be assumed to spray 
liquid or gas upon opening. Extra precautions 
must be taken to assure no fluorine, and little 
or no pressure, is in the system before entry. 
Assurances should include valve position checks, 
in-line fluorine concentration sensors, pressure 
gages, helium or nitrogen purges, tags on valves 
to assure no position change, and safety position­ 
ing of all powered valves in case of a power out­ 
age.
Provision of Warning Sensors - With self-con­ 
tained breathing apparatus or gas masks, where 
the wearer will not sense fluorine concentrations 
by smell, automatic warning sensors must be pro­ 
vided. Possibly a system of red, yellow, and 
green would be appropriate — with a green indi­ 
cating below maximum allowable concentration 
(MAC), yellow indicating above MAC but below an 
emergency evacuation level, and red indicating 
an emergency evacuation level. These sensors 
must also be aural since the personnel will not 
constantly monitor them.
Cost Evaluation
vehicle are currently available and it only re­ 
mains to apply this information to the problem of 
a specific vehicle and associated launch facility.
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This discussion has indicated the basic factors 
that must be considered in the design, installa­ 
tion, and operation of a launch facility in sup­ 
port of a fluorine upper stage. Although liquid 
fluorine is more reactive than currently used 
propellants and requires special handling tech­ 
niques, there appears to be no insurmountable 
problems associated with its use. Techniques and 
equipment for supporting an upper stage fluorine
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